Nahmias

I had the opportunity to listen in and ask a question on a Zoom call on a discussion/debate between Robert Sapolsky and Eddy Nahmias. It was hosted by the Agency and Responsibility Research group and moderated by Thomas Nadelhoffer. We can get their bios off the actual discussion itself.

I won’t go through the whole video, but simply focus on the following bullet point at the 33 min 35 s mark. Eddy, on this slide, says this is not changing the definition of free will. I do differ in that it switches from our will to our choice making capacities. And I don’t really care how many compatibilist philosophers are comfortable with this definition.

“Free Will” – capacities to make conscious choices
    – after imagining alternatives, considering reasons for each
    – so as to be the causal source of some of our actions

Anyway, I asked the question, “If we have to define free will in terms of consciousness, what evidence does Eddy have that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon?” And the answer is in the transcript below. Of course, I had a few concerns with his take:

So, I don’t have any definitive proof that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon.

Fair enough. But that was not the question I asked. Perhaps uncharitably, I thought of this as a bait and switch. I was asking for evidence, and Eddy answered with a fundamentally epistemological response, thus avoiding my question altogether. More charitably, my background is scientific, and I was asking a science-based question, and Eddy, being a philosopher by trade, answered philosophically.

Eddy went on to describe what an epiphenomenon is for the benefit of the audience, which, of course, is fair enough. I was unaware that Huxley had tackled this with the train and whistle example. Though I think a modern example of a transformer and the resultant hum might be a better example today. But I will look at what Huxley had to say and add this to my arsenal, thanks. Eddy goes on to say:

… I don’t have a knockdown argument against it. I think it is implausible for the same reasons any form of dualism is implausible because it’s ultimately going to be a form of dualism …

Well, here I tend to align with Eddy; I, too, have a deep mistrust of dualism. If epiphenomenalism is associated with dualism, I ought to be more careful in considering it as a possibility. But, hold on a moment; whistles and hums, clearly epiphenomena, are not intrinsically dualistic in themselves, not that we think trains and transformers have minds. Eddy goes on to suggest the epiphenomenalist’s consciousness has no connection with the brain and the outside world. This, I think, is a valid point if taken too far. Sure, train whistles impact the outside world; they use steam from the boiler, which could be used to move the train. Hums cause vibrations, which might cause wear on the windings or loosen screws. Similarly, our consciousness might give us a false sense of agency. So, I don’t think that epiphenomenalism insists that consciousness is somehow different from the material world or that there is no downward causation. I don’t see that epiphenomenalism necessitates dualism, but I agree that certain interpretations might fall foul of dualism. I might add that with epiphenomenalism, there is a hint of teleology. ie consciousness is not doing anything useful (purposefulness). Though a compatibilist might have the same problem.

It would be a very strange thing if it were if they were brain processes for them to have no causal effects on other brain processes, because that’s not the way the brain works

Yet Eddy says we know not yet how [consciousness] yet [gets?] produced. I can’t help thinking there is an argument from incredulity creeping in: along the lines, I don’t know how, but epiphenomenalism must be false. There is plenty of evidence that the brain produces all sorts of illusions. I would argue that the study of naive realism is a testament to this. Eddy argues that there would be (a) no downward causation, (b) it would be a strange thing, and (c) remains agnostic on the mechanism and what is actually happening. My response:
   (a) no downward causation does not necessarily follow.
   (b) if by strange, we mean does not agree with certain world views, then I agree
   (c) I am agnostic about the mechanism of consciousness, so I would be a little circumspect about consciousness and its attributes.

I understand I am probably using epiphenomenon in a non-standard way. If consciousness is, say, a chemical brain state, then, sure, these chemical states affect one another, and conscious perceptions will be affected up and down the causal chemical chain. But at no point am I consciously changing my chemical brain states.

… why we should think consciousness is not part of the natural world and is epiphenomenal.

I would like to see the reasoned steps that lead to this type of conclusion. I also wonder whether Eddy would be willing to concede that there might be interpretations that are consistent with epiphenomenalism?

… they shouldn’t give in to an epiphenomenalist argument too quickly.

And here I again agree with Eddy. As yet, I have not. But then, I am not sure Eddy would argue that we should not give in to the compatibilist definition too quickly. ie Define free will in terms of consciousness, which we still don’t understand how it works and even if it does anything.

And finally, I would like to thank Dr Eddy Nahmias for the presentation and discussion. Dr Nadelhoffer, the opportunity to participate. And of course Dr Robert Sapolsky for his presentation and books. Especially Behave. I got to about page 350, and thought surely Robert can’t believe in free will. I then immediately looked up free will in the index and read the relevant pages.

Transcript
rom:  Luckily, my question is shorter. A question for Eddy.
If we have to define free will in terms of consciousness, what evidence does Eddy have that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon?
Eddy:  Thank you for the question.
Thomas: Take that Eddy. [a not unbiased moderator]
Eddy:  So, I don’t have any definitive proof that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon. For those in the audience, that means something that’s caused, but that has no causal powers. Right? So, Huxley gave us this image of like the sound of a train whistle. Is that a good image of epiphenomenalism? It doesn’t cause the train moving. The train moving is caused by the coal and the whistle is just an effect of the smoke leaving the engine, but it has no cause, at least no cause on the train moving.

So, there are deep worries about whether consciousness in humans, and I guess, animals, is epiphenomenal and has no causal role to play. I don’t have a knockdown argument against it. I think it is implausible for the same reasons any form of dualism is implausible because it’s ultimately going to be a form of dualism that suggests there’s something like consciousness that is different from the material world and is not, and has no causal connection in the downward direction from the material world.

But I think it’s much more plausible to think that consciousness is a process that we experience with its unique features of first-personal subjectivity that is somehow we know not yet how yet produced by natural organisms, natural organs, the brain in humans, and that the processes that are responsible for consciousness. It would be a very strange thing if it were if they were brain processes for them to have no causal effects on other brain processes, because that’s not the way the brain works. It’s a highly interconnected organ. So that whatever the consciousness processes are very likely going to affect later processes.

All of that’s consistent with lots of consciousness being produced by unconscious processes, with consciousness playing a smaller causal role than we tend to think it does, because we think consciousness is kind of who we are. So, we give it a lot of importance. So, all of those things are possible, but I don’t see any metaphysical arguments for why we should think consciousness is not part of the natural world and is epiphenomenal. And I would use my interventionist theories of causation that people like Peter Menses [Menzies?] have used to respond to causal closure arguments from [Kant?]. If you want like more details about how I’d respond to the metaphysical arguments. Hopefully, other people picked up on a little bit of that to see why they shouldn’t give in to an epiphenomenalist argument too quickly.
Thomas:  I don’t want more details, Eddy.